WPBFD History

the wind. It certainly looked macho as the huge machines rolled out of the stations with the troops prominently dis- played. Firefighters hanging on with one hand would put on bunker coats as the mighty engines dodged through city traffic with sirens blaring. At night groggy men with unsteady hands rode into the darkness on the bucking, crimson beasts. Firefighters began asking why they had to be sub- jected to the hazards of riding the tailboards when jump seats were available on most apparatus. Some of the an- swers they heard from the administration against riding in the jump seats included; hose evolutions would take too long, not all trucks had jump seats (the always good "standardization argument"), and the men could see and react better from the tailboard. Another argument was that no injuries had yet occurred because of riding the tailboards. The most outlandish reason was that a fire- fighter could get crushed in the jump seat if a large truck hit a pumper broadside. Incredulous firefighters asked what would happen to the men on the tailboard if an acci- dent like that occurred. Perhaps the actual reason for hav- ing men on the tailboard was simply tradition. Chief Kennedy listened to his chief officers and decided to keep his men on the tailboards despite evidence of the potential dangers. In February of 1976 Company 1-A was returning to Central Station after an alarm. A firefighter lost his foot- ing as he stepped off the tailboard in front of the station. He fell to the ground as the pumper began backing toward him, but the man was able to scramble out of the way. Kennedy heard about the close call and the next day fire- fighters were riding in the jump seats for a period of one month. The bulletin announcing the change advised that this was "an experiment to determine if response is im- peded, tactics jeopardized or equipment lost because of unoccupied tailboards." Kennedy's one month experi- ment was still in effect long after he retired. On Friday night, February 13, 1976, Assistant Chief John McRae visited the Twin Lakes High School gymna- sium where a basketball game was in progress. More than a thousand people were in the stands watching the big game. McRae found all of the exit doors chained and locked which presented a major life hazard should even a small fire break out in the building. School officials seemed more concerned that a few people might sneak into the game without paying, but McRae insisted that all the chains be removed from the exit doors. "They know they should have been open," was all a reporter could get out of McCrae. Fire safety in schools had been a problem for the department since the Florida legislature had deemed schools entirely separate political entities answerable only to themselves. As Chief Kennedy explained, "The fire department has absolutely no jurisdiction over schools.

trained at Emergency Medical Technician I level. In or- der to set an example he signed-up to take the first course offered. "I didn't sit back with my legs on my desk and say you guys go do this," Kennedy recalled. "I went out there and took the first class myself. What the hell could [the firefighters] say?" In December the department first offered free blood pressure checks to the public. This cooperative effort between the Palm Beach County fire departments and the High Blood Pressure Council would become a popular service for all county residents. The first Tues- day of each month was specified for blood pressure checks in all fire stations. Firefighters had been complaining for some time that the 150-foot pre-connect leader lines were too short. It seemed that at most fires another 50-feet of hose had to be added causing needless delay in extinguishment. The matter had been taken to the Training Division and, in December, Chief Kennedy okayed a 200-foot leader line on the right side of all pumpers. The left side leader line was kept at 150-feet. In March of 1983 the left side leader line was increased to 200 feet. The movie Towering Inferno brought to light the po- tential threat of fire in modern high rise buildings. In De- cember State Representative John J. Considine wanted to introduce legislation that would require all future high rise construction of four stories or more to be equipped with automatic sprinkler systems. All existing structures of that height would have to install automatic sprinkler systems or smoke sensing devices by 1985. The bill was commonly referred to as "The Towering Inferno Bill." Considine met with Chief Kennedy and State Fire Mar- shall Olin Greene to discuss the proposed legislation. West Palm Beach had instituted codes in April of 1973 that required all new high rises over five stories to have built-in sprinkler systems and alarm systems moni- tored by the fire department. Standpipes and hose cabi- nets were also mandatory. 1976 An arsonist struck again on January 3, 1976. Gaso- line had been poured through holes in a rear door of a car- pet warehouse at 621-1st Street and then set afire. Fire- fighters spent hours removing the singed rolls of wet car- peting to ensure complete extinguishment. During the 1970s safety issues became more of a concern. Increased union activities and a new breed of firefighter were two of the primary reasons for the immer- gence of a more conscientious approach to the perils of fire control. The first pumper with jump seats had been purchased back in the early 1960s and all subsequent pumpers had been similarly equipped, but the men were still hanging onto the tailboards with coattails flapping in

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